

Message Text

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12

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 DODE-00 OMB-01 L-03 H-02 MC-02 ACDA-05 SAJ-01

EUR-12 ARA-06 EA-07 AF-06 /089 W

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R 170500Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

59 473#:/SECSTATE WASHDC 7376

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSU JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SANA 0540

E.O. 116

6, GDS

TAGS: MASS, YE

SUBJECT: YAR ARMS

REF: SANA 477

SUMMARY ASNAJ PROVIDES MORE BACKGROUND ON YARG
ATTITUDES RE ARMS.

1. IN CONVERSATION ON FEBRUARY 12 WITH YARG FONMIN
ABDALLAH AL-ASNAJ CHARGE WENT OVER, IN GENERAL WAY AS IN
REFTEL, PRESENT STAGE OF ARMS EFFORTS BY USG FOR YARG.
PROVIDED NO DETAILS, BUT SAID I PLEASED WE GETTING
INTO DETAILS OF PURCHASES AND TRAINING. SAID SAUDI PLAN
WAS IMPRESSIVE EVIDENCE SAUDI MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM
AND GOOD WILL TOWARD YARG.

2. ASNAJ SAID THIS WAS GOOD NEWS, WHICH PARALLELED
NEWS FROM SAUDIS. HE SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED.
HE SAID HE HAD HEARD SAUDIS WERE EXPEDITING RESIDENCE

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OF MILITARY MISSION HERE. HE SAID SAUDI POLICY HAD

UNDERGONE DRAMATIC CHANGE FROM "SEARCH" FOR "WEAK AND DIVIDED YEMEN" TO "SUPPORT FOR STRONG AND FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT IN SANAA". YEMENIS EXPECTED NO LESS, BUT GRATEFUL AND PLEASED. THEY WOULD RECIPROCATE.

3. THEN, ASNAJ SAID HE WANTED TO WARN USG ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF "SETBACKS".

4. HE SAID THAT YEMENI HAD BEEN IN PRESENT STAGE OF DISCUSSIONS RE ARMS FROM SUADIS AT LEAST TWICE BEFORE. AND WOULD HAVE "DOUBTS ABOUT ANYTHING MATERIALIZING" UNTIL NEW SHIPMENTS BEGAN ACTUALLY TO ARRIVE. SAUDIS, HE SAID, MOVED SLOWLY POINTED TO MODERN 1.) MM HOWITIZERS WHICH NOW SAUDIS HAVE SHIPPED HIM. ASNAJ NODDED AND SAID THEY CAME WITHOUT AMMO.

5. HE ALSO SAID THAT HAMDI, ON HIS VISIT TO SUDAN, HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF MOST MODERN SORT WHICH IS THERE, APPARENTLY WITHOUT OBJECTION FROM SAUDIS. HAMDI, HE SAID, WOULD SEE SAME THING IN EGYPT LATER THIS MONTH ON OFFICIAL VISIT THERE.

6. HE THEN SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH, AT FIRST ELLIPTICALLY AND THEN MORE BLUNTLY, ABOUT WHAT HE REAGRDS AS FRAILITIES OF USG FOREIGN POLICY. HE SAID CONGRESS SEEMED TO BE ABLE TO CHECK THE PRESIDENT, AND SEEMED WANT TO MOVE TO ALTER WHOLE POSTURE OF UZIFOREIGN POLICY OF LAST TWO DECADES. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT SEEMED TO BE SUPPORTED BY NATIONAL MOOD IN US. SOVIETS, BY CONTRAST, SEEMED TO BE WILLING FILL RESULTING VOID WITH REDOUBLED EFFORTS. WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN ANGOLA, SAID ASNAJ, WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN SHORTLY IN DJIBOUTI, AFTER FRENCH LEFT. THEN SOMALI FORCES WELL ARMED AND CLAIMING REVOLUTIONARY AND REACIAL MOTIVES, WOULD TAKE OVER WITH A LOT OF HELP FROM CUBANS, NORTH KOREANS, NORTH VIETNAMESE. CUBANS AND SOVIETS WERE STRENGTHENING PDRY, HAD POTENTIAL FOR CREATING TROUBLE IN YAR.

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7. I SAID SITUATION IN ARABIAN PENINSULA WAS DIFFERENT. USG HAD PROVED MANY TIMES TO BE DEPENDABLE FRIEND OF YARG. USG ALSO HAS LEADING ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST WHICH HAS MADE EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESSES POSSIBLE IN LAST SEVERAL YEARS. ARAB FRIEND SHOULD NOT BE DECEIVED ABOUT DEBATE IN US. OUR INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST WERE CLEAR AND WOULD BE PROSECUTED FORCEFULLY. MOREOVER, SAUDIS HAD, AS ASNAJ HIMSELF

SAID, ADOPTED NEW POLICY TOWARD YEMEN AND WERE NOW PURSUING IT WITH GREAT GOOD WILL, TENACITY AND IN MY VIEW ALL POSSIBLE SPEED. SAID THT, FINALLY, I ASSUMED NO RPT NO NEED TELL ASNAJ, AFTER HIS EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH YEMEN, THAT ROAD TO CHANGING AND IMPROVING SITUATION THERE WAS BY SETTING TOUGH CONDITIONS AND INSISTING ON IMPLEMENTATION. ANY OTHER KIND OF ACCOMMODATION WITH SOUTH, OR WITH ITS SOVIET-SUPPORTERS DID NOT SEEM TO ME TO PROMISE ANYTHING GOOD FOR YARG SECURITY.

8. ASNAJ SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS, ACCEPTED IT. WHAT TJ
USG HAD TO REALIZE, HE SAID, WAS THAT YEMEN WAS A "LIABILITY" TO US AND SAUDIS, AND WOULD BE UNTIL IT COULD FINANCE ITSELF. IT NEEDED A LOT OF SUPPORT. IN MEANTIME, IT WAS "NOT A CLIENT".

9. ASNAJ THEN SAID HE WANTED TO STATE ONCE AGAIN WHAT HE HAD EARLIER TOLD AMBASSADOR SCOTTS ABOUT SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES. TO MAKE SURE HE HAD NOT RPT NOT MISLEAD AMBASSADOR, OR BEEN MISLEAD HIMSELF, HE HAD "CHECKED MATTER". THERE WAS NO NEW ARMS AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS, HE SAID FIRMLY. NOTHING HAD BEEN SIGNED. WHEN ABD

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MARSHALL GRECHKO STAGED A DINNER AT WHICH HZLN
GRECHKO PRODUCED AN ARMS REQUESTED WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY PREPARED BY MUHSIN AL-WUNI.
AL-AYNI, SAID ASNJ, WAS ALWAYS TOO CLEVER BY HALF. HE HAD SOLD YARG ON IDEA OF VERY LONG AND SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT REQUEST ON GROUNDS THAT SOVIETS WOULD SURELY REJECT IT. GRECHKO, HOWEVER,
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TOLD ABDALALIM THAT LIST WAS APPROVED. THERE WAS CONDITION: SHIPMENTS OF MOST NEW EQUIPMENT WOULD BEGIN AFTER HAMDI VISITED MOSCOW, EVEN FOR TWO DAYS. MEANWHILE SHIPMENT OF OLD AND SOME NEW RPT AND SOME NEW EQUIPMENT WOULD BEGIN AT ONCE.

10. WHEN FIRST SHIP ARRIVED LAST MONTH FROM USSR, SAID ASNAJ, SOVIETS WANTED TO MAKE A "BIG EXHIBITION" OF UNLOADING IT. YARG REFUSED AND SOVIETS TRIED GET REVERSAL. GHASHMI WENT DOWN

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ACTION NEA-10

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NSAE-00 DODE-00 OMB-01 L-03 H-02 MC-02 ACDA-05 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SANA 0540

TO HODEIDA AND TOLD SOVIETS EITHER TO UNLOAD IT
OR MOVE IT, AS IT BLOCKING PORT. FINALLY, AFTER
THINGS UNLOADED, SOVIET MOVED SHIP.

1. ACCORDING TO UK AMBASSADOR, WHO SAY ASNAJ
IMMEDIATELY AFTER ME, ASNAG STORY WAS SLIGHTLY
DIFFERENT. SHIP CONTAINED TWO CARGOES,
ONE FOR YEMEN WITH OLD STUFF AND ONE OTHER CARGO WHICH
EVENTUALLY WENT ELSEWHAER BUT WHICH SOVIETS WANTED
TO SHOW YEMENIS (MIG-21S, T-54'S) AND SOMEHOW SUGGESTED
THEY WOULD UNLOAD IN PORT IF YEMENIS WANTED. GHASHMI
SAID UNLOAD IT OR MOVE THE SHIP. SOVIETS MOVED
THE SHIP, ASNAJ THOUGHT TO ADEN.

12. I PROBABLY DIDN'T GET THIS TORY BECAUSE
I DID NOT RPT NOT INQUIRE ABOUT MIG-21S OR OTHER NEW
EQUIPMENT, PER INSTRUCTIONS. I DID SAY, HOWEVER, SUCH
ITEMS HAD DOUBLE IMPORTANCE. FIRST, THEY WERE
SYMBOLS OF SOVIET ROLE AND MILITARY PROWESS OF YARG.
FRIENDS OF YEMEN WERE INTERESTED IN BOTH. IN ADDITION,
THEY WERE LITMUS TEST OF YARG CREDIBILITY. WE HAD

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BEEN TOLD CLEARLY AND REPEATEDLY THAT THESE ITEMS NOT RPT NOT NOW COMING. IF THEY ARRIVED, QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE WOULD BE CREATED. WE HOPED TO BE TOLD IN ADVANCE IF YARG EXPECTATIONS CHANGED. AS POTENTIAL ARMS SUPPLIER, WE NEEDED AND WANTED COMPLETELY FRANK AND CLEAR RELATIONSHIP.

13. ASNAJ DID NOT DEMUR, AND SAID ONLY HE WAS REPORTING FACTS AS HE KNEW THEM.

14. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH TALK TOUCHED FRANKLY ON SOME SENSITIVE ISSUES--"FRAILITIES" OF USG POLICY AND CREDIBILITY OF YARG--ASNAJ WAS IN REFLECTIVE MOOD AND WAS AS WARM AND SELF-POSSESSED AS EVER. I THINK HE IS TELLING US TRUTH AS HE KNOWS IT.

15. HOWEVER, WE NOW HAVE FOUR STORIES ABOUT THE SOVIET ARMS DEAL.

16. FIRST, AS ASNAJ TELLS IT, THERE IS NO DEAL, AND THE ONLY THINGS COMING ARE OLD THINGS. SECOND, AS GHASHMI TELLS IT, THE SOVIETS SENT MIG-21'S AND TANKS BUT AT LAST MINUTE THEY REFUSED DELIVER THEM BECAUSE OF SUSPICION AND ANGER RE SAUDI MILITARY MISSION. THIRD, AS HAMDI TELLING SAUDIS, (ACCORDING TO UK EMBASSY HERE, WHICH ASKED TO CHECK STORY) THE NEW EQUIPMENT ARRIVED BUT HAMDI TOLD THEM TO CARRY OT AWAY. (UK EMBASSY HAS GIVEN SAUDIS VERY QUALIFIED INDICATION THAT LATTER MAY BE TRUE.) FOURTH, WE HAVE UNILATERALL USG REPORTS THAT AGREEMENTS FOR MASSIVE SHIPMENTS ARE SIGNED, THE WQUIPMENT IS ON ITS WAY OR SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY, THE FIRST SHIP BROUGHT NO MORE AND NO LESS THAN EXPECTED.

17. I HAVE HELD THIS REPORT IN HOPES THAT IN LAST FOUR DAYS, WE COULD COME UP WITH MORE OR BETTER INFORMATION WHICH WOULD ALLOW US MAKE INFORMED GUESS ABOUT THE FOUR STORIES ABOVE. SO FAR, THAT SILL REMAINS ONLY A HOPE. I THINK WE SHOULD ASK FOR SAUDI VIEWS.

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18. IN ANY CASE, SOVIETS ARE I THINK AT LEAST AS UNSURE OF THEIR FOOTING AND THE FACTS HERE AS WE ARE, AND I AM CONVINCED THAT WE CAN TURN OFF OR REDUCE FLOW OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THEM IF RPT IF WE CAN MOUNT A CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE.
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